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Abstract 
The aim of this article is to analyze the controversies surrounding ADHD and 
the  process  whereby  this  psychiatric  unit  was  formed  and  constituted  as 
a social and scientific fact. We focus mainly on the arguments around ADHD 
in the United States – this is dictated by significant differences between the 
ways to define and treat this disorder between various countries (Bonati 2006; 
Cohen 2006: 14). The abovementioned controversies make us conscious of the 
fact that despite what a considerable number of psychiatrists, scientists and 
other “spokespeople” for the entity that is ADHD claim, the dominating ap-
proach to this disorder has not been based on self-evident, irrefutable scien-
tific findings. What is more important, however, is that the quarrelling actors 
reveal the circumstances and the way in which the definition, as well as the 
methods of researching and treating ADHD were formed. 
Keywords: ADHD; analysis of the controversy; the black boxes; DSM; medical-
ization; psychiatry; actor-network theory. 
 
 
                                                             
189 The first version of the article was published in: Bożena Płonka-Syroka i Michał Skrzypek, ed. 
2010.  Doświadczanie  choroby  w  perspektywie  badań  interdyscyplinarnych.  Wrocław:  Akademia 
Medyczna im. Piastów Śląskich: 29-65. 
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Introduction 
Attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) is a mental disorder
190 charac-
terised by the occurrence of three types of problems: (1) hyperactivity that is 
pathological for the given stage of development, (2) impulsiveness, that is the 
inability to stop oneself from undertaking action and not paying attention to 
their circumstances, which results in the actions being sudden and chaotic, 
(3) an  attention  disorder  consisting  in  difficulty  in  focusing  and  absorbing 
information. ADHD is perceived as a disorder that significantly hinders one’s 
functioning  within  society.  The  number  of  diagnosed  cases keeps growing, 
and increasingly more attention is devoted to ADHD in the scientific, clinical, 
as well as in the public discourse. 
The beginnings of psychiatric inquiry into hyperactivity and attention disor-
der can be seen already in the 1920s. However, hyperactivity and the atten-
tion disorders frequently connected therewith appear as diagnostic categories 
only in the 1950s. Hyperactivity was being associated with some forms of neu-
rological disorders almost since the very start. The current definition of ADHD 
has evolved as a result of a long history of transformations – hyperactivity 
was termed Minimal Brain Damage or Minimal Brain Dysfunction (MBD), Hy-
peractive Syndrome, Hyperkinesis, Hyperactive Disorder of Childhood by differ-
ent scholars in different periods. Within the last years Attention Deficit Disor-
der  (ADD)  was  divided  into  two  distinct  types  –  ADD  with  hyperactivity 
(ADD+H) and ADD without hyperactivity (ADD-H) (see: Barkley 2006; Conrad 
& Potter 2000). All those terms have been replaced by ADHD, and hyperactivi-
ty was associated with attention disorders in its very definition. 
Representatives of the mainstream research claim that ADHD constitutes an 
entirely  new  medical  unit.  It  is  considered  a  condition  that  is  (1)  chronic, 
(2) hereditary, (3) neurobiologically based, and that, despite the original as-
sumptions (4) touches not only children, but also adults and adolescents. It is 
assumed that we are currently in possession of precise diagnostic criteria that 
allow not only for identifying various subtypes of ADHD, but also for matching 
pharmacological therapies with individual cases. There exists a rich body of 
literature concerning this disorder, which is a result of many years of neuro-
biological,  genetic,  behavioural,  pedagogical  and  psychiatric  research  (see: 
Conrad & Potter 2000: 566). 
                                                             
190 In  psychiatric literature, the term “disorder” is preferred over “disease” (which is of  more 
biological  character) or “illness” (which signifies self-identification as sick).  Although  ADHD is 
described as a disorder, we decided to use all three terms interchangeably. Our choice is not only 
motivated by stylistic variation, but also by the complexity of biomedicalisation, which, in gen-
eral, turns disorders into biological diseases, as the processes we describe blur the boundaries 
between the conceptions of disorder, disease or sickness. AVANT  Volume IV, Number 1/2013 www.avant.edu.pl 
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So much for the official vision of the disorder. Although the existence, scale 
and characteristics of ADHD are presented in public as facts that are non-
controversial and  established  by science,  a  closer  analysis  of  the discourse 
reveals that the consensus regarding ADHD is not commonplace at all. The 
disorder turns out to be an object of numerous controversies, both scientific 
and public. It is not only therapy by means of strong stimulants that are de-
rivatives of amphetamine, such as Ritalin or Adderall, which cause a string of 
negative side effects, including strong addiction, that gives raise to much de-
bate. Attention is also drawn to the ambiguity of criterions regarding ADHD, 
which leave a large leeway for diagnosing people, resulting in, among others, 
the danger of overdiagnosis. The doubts reach further, as they concern the 
very nature of ADHD and its ontological status: numerous psychiatrists, soci-
ologists, pediatricians and psychologists contest the neurobiological etiology 
of the illness or its hereditary character. ADHD is repeatedly denied the status 
of a new, separate mental illness. Finally, in extreme cases, it is openly con-
sidered an invention of more or less vested actors, among which pharmaceu-
tical companies are named. In this context, various authors write about the 
“ADHD industry” or treat the disorder as a “hoax” or a “fraud”. Voices of criti-
cism are formulated not only by marginal scholars, but also by those of a sig-
nificant standing. The critics of the dominating paradigm also quote reliable 
research and formulate methodologically correct hypotheses (Cohen 2006: 12-
33). 
It is worth considering a number of questions here. How it is possible that the 
scientists,  relying  on  their  methodologies, are unable  to  reach  a consensus 
regarding the status, etiology and therapy of a disorder? How is it possible 
that  despite  abundant  controversies  doctors  diagnose  ADHD  on  a  massive 
scale and prescribe strong stimulants as a part of the therapy? How useful 
here is thinking that the representatives of one side have strayed, or that their 
notions fell prey to cognitive distortions, while the representatives of the oth-
er  side  deliver  objective  knowledge?  Are  we  dealing  here  with  a  situation 
marginal  to  science  and  medicine  or,  perhaps,  a  commonplace  one?  And 
above all, how can an outside observer know who is closer to the truth in the 
end? 
The aim of this article is to analyse the controversies surrounding ADHD and 
the  process  whereby  this  psychiatric  unit  was  formed  and  constituted  as 
a social and scientific fact. We focus mainly on the arguments around ADHD 
in the United States – this is dictated by significant differences between the 
ways to define and treat this disorder between various countries (Bonati 2006; 
Cohen 2006: 14). The above-mentioned controversies make us conscious of the 
fact that despite what a considerable number of psychiatrists, scientists and 
other “spokespeople” for the entity that is ADHD claim, the dominating ap-
proach to this disorder has not been based on self-evident, irrefutable scien-
tific findings. What is more important, however, is that the quarrelling actors A-socio-logy of psychiatric disorder 
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reveal the circumstances and the way in which the definition, as well as the 
methods of researching and treating ADHD were formed. 
It has to be noted at the outset that in the present description we do not take 
a stand in the reconstructed disputes, and we do not seek to solve or invali-
date them. We only attempt to trace their dynamics, as well as identify re-
sources and strategies utilised by the representatives of both sides while en-
deavouring to establish their definition of the situation as the dominating one. 
Finally, we try to show the social, political and cultural consequences of the 
activities of the described actors. 
The research framework that we use in our analysis is actor-network theory 
(ANT) (Callon 1991; Latour 1999, 2005). It is a general theoretical perspective 
that has been developed for three decades by representatives of various social 
sciences. It derives from sociology of scientific knowledge and science and 
technology studies  and  stems  directly from  the anthropology  of  laboratory 
(see: Latour & Woolgar 1979; Knor Cetina 1981, 1999). It main creators are 
Bruno Latour (1991, 1993, 1999, 2004), Michael Callon (1986, 1991) and John 
Law (1997, 1999). It is a particular feature of ANT that it describes society not 
only from the point of view of “strictly social” relations and processes which 
were within the field of interest of standard sociology, but it also takes into 
account the results of factors that have been produced by scientific, medical 
and engineering practice. This regards, on the one hand, technological innova-
tions, and, on the other, elements of nature investigated and represented by 
the scientists. ANT assumes a rather particular ontology of the world, but it 
allows one to avoid certain problems of philosophical nature that traditional 
sociology of knowledge, as well as general social theory, would become em-
broiled with (see e.g. Sojak 2004). 
The present text constitutes not only an analysis of research and controversies 
surrounding ADHD, but, above all, an attempt at showcasing in what way it is 
possible / worth it to consider medicine, science and engineering and their 
products. It is pointed out with increasing frequency that psychiatry, medi-
cine, engineering or science as such do not deliver unambiguous answers to 
the questions posed to them. The role of experts and their analyses in social 
life, as well as the way they are perceived, have undergone significant chang-
es in the age of late modernity. It is with increasing frequency that controver-
sies, ambivalence and ambiguity surrounding the creation of knowledge and 
resolving  scientific  controversies  are  publicly  revealed  (Beck  1992;  Callon 
& Lascoumes  Bartheet  2009;  Latour  1999;  Collins  &  Evans  2002,  2007).  The 
scientific disputes around global warming, made public within the last dec-
ade, are a great example. These controversies touch upon the reasons, conse-
quences, or the scope of this phenomenon, as well as the methods of research 
and ways of dealing with it (see: Demeritt 2001, 2006; Levitt & Dubner 2009; AVANT  Volume IV, Number 1/2013 www.avant.edu.pl 
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Zehr 2000). A similar level of uncertainty is encountered in the case of the 
diagnosis, therapy and status of ADHD. 
In the first part of the text we introduce selected tools and assumptions of 
ANT. We suggest that the readers who are well-familiar with this framework 
move to the second, essential part of the text, which is devoted to the analysis 
of the controversies surrounding ADHD. We begin by reconstructing the rep-
resentation of ADHD maintained within the main trends of research and the 
way it is socially adopted and sustained. We then focus on the methods by the 
means of which one tries to dismantle or re-build the social and scientific per-
ception of ADHD. We are especially interested in the decisions regarding the 
definition  and  classification  of  mental  disorders,  selected  scientific  studies, 
public appearances of experts, popularising publications, reactions of the par-
ents of children with ADHD, the actions of pharmaceutical companies and the 
work of social organisations promoting the fight against ADHD. The three pro-
cesses this analysis focuses on are (1) the gradual making of ADHD into a so-
cially irrefutable, objective construct, which becomes an element of Lebens-
welt;  (2)  the  process  of  medicalisation  associated  with  ADHD,  consisting  in 
a gradual redefinition of the illness, as a result of which it encompassed in-
creasingly more potential patients; (3) the attempts at questioning and prob-
lematising ADHD as an objective phenomenon. The text is closed by a sum-
mary focusing on the issue of managing scientific, medical and technological 
controversies in the age of late modernity. 
 
Part 1: Follow the actors! 
Closing the black boxes 
ANT constitutes a general theoretic perspective in the field of sociology, which 
has developed as a result of ethnographic analyses of laboratory practice. The 
motivation behind such research was the wish to confirm theses regarding 
social construction of scientific facts that were stemming from the strong pro-
gram  of  sociology  of  knowledge (Bloor  1991;  Barnes,  Bloor  &  Henry  1996). 
However,  the first  ethnographic  studies already showed  the  inadequacy  of 
social constructivism – on the level of laboratory practice scientific knowledge 
was not determined by cultural, ideological or political factors in such a way 
as sociology of scientific knowledge had hitherto imagined. Yet, it does not 
mean that the anthropology of science returned to the objectivist model of 
cognition. As anthropologists show, scientists in their laboratories do not rep-
resent nature as much as actively transform it. It does not happen exclusively 
on the level of knowledge, but already in the layer of the very object of study – 
the scientists physically manipulate samples and process them, re-create or 
create effects, finally, they visualise the phenomena in the format most suita-
ble for themselves in order to reduce the complexity of cognitive problems A-socio-logy of psychiatric disorder 
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before them. This is necessary, because the world given us in the everyday, 
common experience is usually too complex for us to be able to grasp regulari-
ties or identify general patterns (Latour 1983; see Abriszewski & Afeltowicz 
2007). 
On the grounds of ANT the complex transformations and shifts that objects, 
concepts  and  visualisations  undergo  are  termed  translations.  This  term  is 
supposed to encapsulate the fact that every reconfiguration of the objects of 
research allows one to gain something, but that it also means losses (analogi-
cally to the fact that linguistic translation causes a term or a phrase to lose 
some meanings, gaining new ones at the same time) (Latour 1999: 24-79; Law 
2006). One of the aims of the researcher’s work is to maintain the credibility 
of  individual  translations  and  to  defend  them  from  the  criticism  of  co-
researchers. Visualisations, models and explanations generated by science do 
not mirror nature. We mostly realise that when one object of nature is trans-
lated in at least two competing ways, as a result of which we receive incom-
mensurable “versions” thereof (see e.g. Mol 2002; cf. Abriszewski & Afeltowicz 
2009). 
Establishing a scientific fact does not come down exclusively to creating cred-
ible and repeatable translations of the world. Apart from “negotiating with 
nature” it is also necessary to negotiate with other scientists. Latour devotes 
much  attention  to  positive  and  negative  modalisations  of  scientific  theses 
(Latour 1987: 22-29). Positive modalisations are such framings of a thesis that 
cause it to be perceived as more credible, or, at least, less problematic. This 
refers to such statements as “it is true that x,” “it has been shown that x.” 
A negative modalisation consists in distancing the thesis from the status of 
objective knowledge. Examples of negative modalities are not only “it is not 
true that x” or “it is doubtful that x,” but also “A and B determined that x” – 
evoking the context in which a thesis was formulated results in it being treat-
ed as someone’s creation or a fact speaking for itself. The fewer modalities 
a  thesis  is  surrounded  with,  the  closer  it  is  to  the  status  of  objective 
knowledge. Significantly, theses situated at both ends of the objective / unob-
jective  spectrum are passed  over  in  the  discourse.  Theses  of  extreme  non-
objectivity are treated as unworthy of discussion. Generally accepted theses 
pass into the sphere of unarticulated assumptions and tacit knowledge; more-
over, on their basis new instruments might be designed. As this reveals, it is 
the researches who make decisions regarding the fate of theses and postulated 
phenomena – by the means of positive modalisations of statements, removing 
modalities or stacking new works over them, thus making them more objec-
tive. When a thesis becomes entwined into various fields of scientific experi-
ence, undermining it turns out to be extremely expensive.  
 AVANT  Volume IV, Number 1/2013 www.avant.edu.pl 
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When trying to establish a scientific fact, a scholar must also take care of ne-
gotiations  with  institutions  and  non-scientific  actors,  whose  resources  are 
necessary for continuing the (most frequently) expensive research. The lack of 
relations of such kind may hinder or paralyse the process of building stable 
translations.  However,  the  means  indispensable for  “mobilising the  world” 
are provided to the scientists not for pure knowledge, but because of products, 
services, techniques, predictions and expertises that they might produce. It 
ought to be kept in mind that the interests of the institutions supporting sci-
ence most frequently also require being constructed (Latour 1983: 144-145, 
1987: 108-121). The groups of interest do not always wait for a scientist that 
would solve their problems – frequently their interest constitutes a result of 
actions of the researchers; researchers frequently articulate or define what is 
of interest to others and what is not. 
Finally, scientists must take care of a proper public representation of their 
products. This regards not only a given phenomenon postulated by scientists 
becoming an element of the common perception of the world. A statement or 
an object are the more objective, the more social practices they become en-
twined in and the more institutions are founded upon them. 
It is important to consider all the aforementioned processes together. Mobilis-
ing allies is necessary for effective, if expensive, creation of credible transla-
tions.  Non-scientific  institutions  will  supply given  research, but  most  often 
only when the scholars are able to offer results that are credible and recog-
nised in the environment, and when they [the scholars] skillfully sign into 
their interest. Thus, in order to receive “supply”, the scholars also have to mo-
bilise  the  world  itself.  Similar  significance  can  be  ascribed  to  rooting  the 
awareness of a given phenomenon in non-scientific knowledge and practices. 
Mutual  relations  between  mobilising  the  world  by  the  means  of  scientific 
translations,  mobilising  co-researchers,  mobilising  non-scientific  allies  and 
public representations are illustrated by Latour’s circulatory system of scien-
tific facts – or so called “blood flow”  (see Fig. 1). 
Why, however, does a given thesis become irrefutable due to circulation of 
resources?  Scientific fact,  that  is a  socially  “stable”  construct  which  is  per-
ceived as objective, is referred to as a black box within ANT terminology (Cal-
lon 1991; Latour 1987). Black boxes constitute strong associations of diverse 
interests, research resources, convictions and social relations that are difficult 
to question / sever. A black box can be defined in terms of the costs of its pos-
sible dismantling – an object is the more stable (which can be read as “more 
objective”  or  “real”),  the  more  resources  its  possible  deconstruction  would 
take up. Deconstructing a given fact might be connected not only with the 
necessity  of  questioning  the  works  of  other  researchers,  or  the  knowledge 
written down in textbooks, but it can also mean the necessity of reconstruct-
ing practices and social institutions, in which a given scientific construct was A-socio-logy of psychiatric disorder 
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entangled. A construct is the more stable, the more was stacked over it and 
the more the field of knowledge and practices would have to be reconstructed 
as a result of its deletion. However, it ought to be remembered that there al-
ways exists a possibility of dismantling a black box – it remains only a ques-
tion of costs that a community would have to bear (cf. Sojak 2004: 238-244). 
Fig. 1. The circulatory system of scientific facts model  
(cf. Latour 1999: 98-108). 
 
Effective  mobilisation  of  “resources”  within  one  loop  allows  for  effective  mobilisation  of  re-
sources in the remaining areas. Stopping the circulation of resources in one loop may significant-
ly slow down the process of creating irrefutable knowledge. The resources from one loop may be 
partially converted in order to improve the compensating for various deficiencies in individual 
loops. Within this model there cannot be drawn a borderline between the content and the context 
of science, or between strictly cognitive and social actions of scientists. 
 
Seamless networks 
ANT  is  not  limited  to  explaining  the  process  of  constructing  black  boxes. 
Above  all,  it  shows  the  way  in  which  products  of  science  shape  and  co-
constitute society (Latour 1991, 1992). The creators of ANT reach as far as as-
cribing the status of actors to such technological factors and elements of the 
natural  environment  as  microbes, cancer,  global  warming,  etc.  In  order to 
illustrate this, let us utilise an example taken from Latour (1983, 1988). When 
making discoveries within microbiology, not only did Louis Pasteur introduce 
a new, theretofore unknown source of danger into common consciousness, 
thus organising a large area of cultural experience – he explained mysterious 
symptoms  and  unpredictable  epidemics  –  but,  most  of  all,  he  introduced 
a wholly new actor into society: microbes that are invisible to the naked eye, 
ubiquitous, and potentially dangerous. Microbes do not speak with their own 
voices, they need “spokespeople” in the shape of doctors, sanitarians, epide-AVANT  Volume IV, Number 1/2013 www.avant.edu.pl 
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miologists or scientists who create and hold up their public representation. 
Moreover, these spokespeople can show other actors - this time, people - how 
they should behave when it comes to the activity of microbes. Under the in-
fluence  of  the  microbiological  concept  people  started  to  approach  various 
practices, relations, and social institutions in a new way. The conviction re-
garding  microbiological  causes  of  some  illnesses  has  become  preserved  in 
such  prosaic  actions  as  boiling  milk,  washing  hands  and  brushing  teeth. 
A number of market and political institutions had to start taking into account 
the activity of a new (f)actor. Theory of microbiology and techniques compiled 
by Pasteur had a colossal importance for medical care, hygiene, urban plan-
ning, animal breeding, preservation and transportation of food, as well as for 
the methods of warfare. 
On the grounds of ANT the objects of science and other products of laborato-
ries are ascribed a certain amount of autonomy and agency. This enforces 
a change in the way of thinking about the range of subjectivity of groups and 
individuals. Most of all, within this framework individual elements – people, 
groups, technologies or natural phenomena represented by scientists – never 
act independently, in separation from the other elements. ANT is consistently 
anti-essentialist and relational: all actors are constituted by the networks of 
relations within which they are located, and their properties are derivative of 
these connections. The objects stabilise each other reciprocally, at the same 
time setting each other frameworks for acting. Every social change constitutes 
a deep intervention into this network of reciprocal relations. Let us emphasise 
that these networks are hybrid and, at the same time, seamless – although 
they  are  woven  out  of  entities  that  are  ontologically  different  (that  is 
knowledge, people, technology, utterances, physical interactions), they consti-
tute an inextricable whole. 
This way, we arrive at the very name of the concept – the “actor - network” 
formula is supposed to convey that the actor cannot be analysed in isolation 
from the network and that he/she de facto does not exist outside the network. 
An alternative name for the concept reconstructed herein, evoked in the title 
of our essay, is “a-socio-logy” (see Sojak 2004: 256-266). ANT is “a-sociology,” 
that is a concept which does not limit its analyses to that which is social. At the 
same time, ANT is “asocio-logy,” that is a branch of science focusing not on the 
objects themselves as much as on the associations between them. 
ANT does not constitute a theory as such, but rather a certain methodological 
perspective – it offers a set of notions, directives and models that serve study-
ing the social world in a new, fuller manner (Latour 1999). In its most mini-
malist version, ANT can be expressed with the directive “Follow the actors!”: 
try to establish elements that affect other elements, without assuming from 
the very beginning differentiation into factors that are active or passive, social 
or  natural,  etc.;  next,  follow  the  trace  of  transformations,  translations  and A-socio-logy of psychiatric disorder 
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mobilisations that are the result of the actions of these elements, thus recon-
structing  the  complex  network  of  processes  and  resources  (Law  1991;  cf. 
Latour 1987). 
In the following part we attempt to trace the way in which the actors closed or 
pried open the black box of ADHD. We take a closer look at the way associa-
tions of heterogenic factors are stringed together and torn apart, and we show 
the way in which ADHD may be perceived in terms somewhat of an actor – 
a construct, which “started to live its own life.” At the outset, however, it is 
worth making the reader aware of some methodological notions and articu-
late the tenets of our analysis. 
 
Part 2: A study of controversies surrounding ADHD 
Introductory remarks 
In our analysis we consistently employ the demand for symmetry, formulated 
on the grounds of sociology of scientific knowledge (Bloor 1991: 7). It is fre-
quent that statements considered false are explained in terms of a cognitive 
error, distortion, the influence of interests or ideology, while opinions consid-
ered true are treated as a result of rational, methodologically correct proceed-
ings, or possibly as something self-evident, which de facto does not require 
explanations. However, the fact that a statement is considered obvious does 
not explain the way in which it achieved such a status. According to the rule 
of symmetry, knowledge considered true and convictions regarded as false 
should be explained in the same categories. Let us elaborate this point. Sci-
ence  studies  show  that  tangles  of  interests  emerge  both  around  the  estab-
lished and the rejected scientific convictions (it is a separate issue to what 
degree these interests can explain the course of the controversies). Moreover, 
they demonstrate that within scientific controversies both sides usually for-
mulate arguments and proofs that are equally internally consistent, methodo-
logically  correct  and  reliable.  It  is  only  when  a  controversy  is  closed  and 
a “correct” outlook on the world is known, some opinions are ascribed the 
status of a self-evident truth or a cognitive error. A retrospective rationalisa-
tion (Fleck 1981) of this kind should not be considered an explanation of sci-
entific knowledge, but rather it demands scientific explanation of its own. 
Another  rule  we  follow  is  avoiding  ascribing  interests  in  order  to  explain 
knowledge. We can frequently ascribe interests of various kinds to the indi-
vidual participants of disputes. Significantly, non-cognitive interests can be 
ascribed both to the spokespeople for theses considered true, and people rep-
resenting concepts that were eventually rejected. The interests not only moti-
vate the actors to act, but repeatedly constitute an effect of these very actions. 
Furthermore, it is very probable that around the winning concept there will AVANT  Volume IV, Number 1/2013 www.avant.edu.pl 
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be produced a stabilising weave of technological and social factors and inter-
ests that are inevitably connected therewith. Thus, the statement that a given 
concept is entangled in some non-cognitive interests does not automatically 
discredit it, not does it constitute its explanation. Rather than ascribe human 
actors  interests,  we  prefer  to  act  according  to  the  “Follow  the  actors!”  di-
rective. Obviously, social and cognitive interests play an important role in our 
study. Let us, however, emphasise: we do not impute interests to the actors, 
but, rather, we trace the way the participants of the dispute themselves do so. 
We  limit  ourselves  to  reconstructing  the  interests  articulated  within  self-
presentation and pointed out with the aim of discrediting the opponents. We 
do not take any sides and our reconstruction does not constitute a move with-
in a social game described here. Nonetheless, we realise that an a-socio-logical 
analysis of various statements regarding ADHD is inevitably a form of their 
negative modalisation.   
Finally, let us add that we do not adopt some specific vision of the world as 
a reference  point  for defining  the aptness  of  opinions  analysed:  we do  not 
adopt either the dominating mainstream vision of ADHD or the perspective 
formulated by the dissenters. We focus on the various ways ADHD is articu-
lated, criticised, defended, assumed and utilised in order to fulfill the goals of 
individual actors. We do not talk about the relation of scientific opinions to 
“the  world  out  there,”  but  we analyse  them  in  terms  of  the  procedures  of 
translations, the cost of undermining them and the possibility of their revi-
sion. 
To summarise, (1) we do not assume any privileged point of view that would 
be external to the discourse and social practices – “a look from nowhere,” nor 
(2) do we start from any specific model of interests and factors that distort 
cognition.  When  we  write  that  a  given  hypothesis  cannot  be  grounded  or 
a given statement cannot be proven on the grounds of methodological stand-
ards, it does not mean that we refer to some idealised standards of scholarship 
- we only evoke methodological standards declared by the participants of the 
discourse, as well as their own, specific utterances, as points of reference. 
 
ADHD as a scientific black box
191 
ADHD constitutes an object of interest of many scholars and psychiatric prac-
titioners. There exists a rich literature regarding this condition, its etiology 
and therapy. ADHD functions in the psychiatric, medical and scientific dis-
courses  alike.  According  to many  scholars,  precise  diagnostic  criteria  have 
been worked out. Scholars and practitioners utilise this knowledge not only in 
                                                             
191 The official representation of ADHD in the scientific discourse is reconstructed herein mainly 
on the basis of Richard Barkley’s work of 2006. A-socio-logy of psychiatric disorder 
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diagnosis and therapy, but this disorder is increasingly frequently cited as an 
example  or  a  starting  point  for  various  neurobiological  studies.  In  other 
words, ADHD is treated by many as an unproblematic black box. 
 
The presence of ADHD in psychiatric diagnostic manuals 
Let us begin with the fact that this unit figures in the commonly used diagnos-
tic textbook Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), used 
by American psychiatrists. By definition, this publication is supposed to be an 
auxiliary tool in the process of diagnosing mental disorders. The textbook is 
prepared by the American Psychiatric Association (APA) and has been pub-
lished since 1952. The fourth, revised edition of the manual – DSM-IV-TR (Di-
agnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 2000), published in 2000 – 
is currently in force. The conditions found in the manual are described by 
means of specific symptoms. Depending on the case, there exists a predeter-
mined number of symptoms a patient has to display in order to be considered 
ill.  Additionally,  a  number  of  conditions  are  divided  into  appropriate  sub-
types. The appearance of a disorder in DSM constitutes a very important point 
in stabilising a given psychiatric unit. 
It is only in 1987 in the third, revised edition of the manual (DSM-III-R) that 
a unit known as ADHD appears, but disorders associated with hyperactivity 
were  introduced  already  in the second  edition. The  latest  DSM  divides the 
symptoms of ADHD into two categories: those connected with attention deficit 
and  those  connected  with  hyperactivity  /  impulsiveness.  All  symptoms  are 
behavioural in character. The categories count nine symptoms each. In order 
to diagnose someone with ADHD, base criteria must be fulfilled: (1) the symp-
toms have to begin before one is seven years old, (2) the child or the adult has 
to demonstrate problems with behaviour in at least two situations (at school, 
at home or at work). (3) the behaviour has to significantly impede the individ-
ual’s social functioning, (4) the behaviour cannot be explained better by other 
diagnostic  units.  Subsequently,  the  patient’s  specific  symptoms  have  to  be 
counted and compared to the list of the two categories. In order to diagnose 
ADHD, within the last six months the patient has to have displayed at least six 
out of the nine symptoms in the attention deficit category, or at least six out of 
the nine symptoms in the hyperactivity / impulsiveness category.  
DSM-IV-TR specifies  three  subtypes  of ADHD.  The  first, the combined type, 
occurs when there are present symptoms (at least six out of nine) both in the 
attention deficit category, and in the hyperactivity / impulsiveness category. 
We deal with the second type, the predominantly inattentive type, when at-
tention deficit dominates, that is, within the last six months the patient has 
displayed at least six out of nine symptoms in the attention deficit category. In 
a case when the third type of ADHD – predominantly hyperactive-impulsive AVANT  Volume IV, Number 1/2013 www.avant.edu.pl 
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type – is diagnosed, six out of nine symptoms in the hyperactivity / impulsive-
ness category have to be observed. 
 
The neurobiological and genetic character of ADHD 
ADHD functions in the discourse and medical practice as a disorder that has 
its permanent place in the illness classification. Likewise, its etiology seems to 
be established. It is considered a biologically hereditary condition of neurobi-
ological background. It is most frequently not treated as a result of the influ-
ence  of  cultural  factors  or  social  surroundings.  Speculations  regarding  the 
neurobiological background of ADHD have appeared almost since the very 
beginnings of studying the cases of children with attention and sensorimotor 
disorders.  However,  it  is  only  recently  that,  thanks  to  the  development  of 
technology, psychiatrists were able to point towards specific neurobiological 
factors responsible – in their opinion – for the troubling behaviour and lack of 
focus. One of the first studies of this kind was conducted in 1990 by Alan Za-
metkin and his team from National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH). Using 
Positron  Emission  Tomography  (PET), he  examined  a  group  of  twenty five 
adults, who were diagnosed with ADHD as children or whose children were 
thusly diagnosed. The study showed a diminished metabolic brain activity in 
the  subjects  as  compared  to  the  control  group  (Zametkin  et  al.  1990).  The 
study was criticised, among other reasons, due to the too small size of the ex-
perimental group; yet, it is considered one of the first proofs for the existence 
of a natural (and not cultural) reason behind the disorder. Analogous study 
was conducted with the use of magnetic resonance (Biedermann et al 1995). 
Neurobiological studies pointed to regions of the brain especially connected 
with the disorders observed in the ADHD patients. 
The latest achievements in the research on the etiology of ADHD have taken 
place in the field of genetics. Most of all, Joseph Biederman’s team needs to be 
mentioned here. The study he conducted in 1995 suggested that the level of 
heredity in case of ADHD reaches up to 57% (Biedermann et al. 1995). The 
1992 study on identical and fraternal twins is another significant piece of re-
search in the field (cf. Gilder et al. 1992). There also exist studies showing that 
the gene responsible for Tourette syndrome and alcoholism may be the rea-
son for ADHD as well. All these factors are associated with brain metabolism, 
and, more precisely, with dopamine excretion. Dopamine is a compound pro-
duced by the prefrontal cortex in order to control and provide stimuli. It is 
thought that a deficit of dopamine might be the very reason behind ADHD 
(Pliszka et al. 1996). The current genetic research focuses on the attempts to 
identify the gene associated with dopamine excretion (Cook 1995). 
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ADHD as a chronic condition 
For a long time, ADHD was associated with hyperactivity and attention disor-
ders in children and adolescents; however, since mid-nineties there has been 
talk about ADHD in adults. The currently conducted long-term research sug-
gests that it is a chronic disorder, displayed not only in childhood, but also 
during adolescence and in adulthood. In order to diagnose adults, the criteria 
found in DSM had to be changed – it is only the 2000 diagnostic manual that 
includes work environment among the situations in which the presence of 
behavioural symptoms has to be checked for an ADHD diagnosis. 
The issue of ADHD in adults has gained common interest due to, among oth-
ers, the work by Edward M. Hallowell and John J. Ratey entitled Driven to Dis-
traction:  Recognizing  and  Coping  with Attention Deficit  Disorder  from  Child-
hood Through Adulthood  (Hallowell & Ratey 1994). The authors are psychia-
trists: one works with children, the other – with adults, both claim to have 
ADHD. The book contains a number of examples and descriptions that are 
supposed to make the reader realise that as a child he/she could have suffered 
from ADHD without being aware of it. Additionally, there can be found a list 
of a hundred questions that a reader can ask of him/herself in order to self-
diagnose ADHD. One can also learn how frequent ADHD is and that – accord-
ing to the authors – such personas as Henry Ford, Beethoven or John F. Ken-
nedy also suffered from it. 
Obviously, the issue of ADHD in adults is also the subject of wide-reaching 
scientific studies. One can refer to a number of works that have shown that 
for many children with an ADHD diagnosis, the symptoms persist throughout 
adolescence (as was documented in sometimes up to 70% of cases), and in 
adulthood (some studies mention 66% of cases) (cf. Barkley et al 1990, Man-
nuzza  et  al.  1993,  International  Consensus  Statement  on  ADHD).  This  only 
confirms the fact commonly accepted in the official medical discourse that the 
occurrence of the illness is not age-limited. 
 
ADHD as a pharmacologically treated condition 
In the psychiatric discourse there exists quite a wide consensus regarding the 
most appropriate ways of treating ADHD. Pharmacological treatment is point-
ed towards as the method of choice. As the representatives of the main stream 
of studies over ADHD, over the last decade efficient medications and a dosage 
system has been worked out, making it possible to manage a variety of diag-
nosed cases and working throughout most of the day. 
Before moving on to discuss specific medications, it is important to sketch the 
institutional  context  connected with production and distribution  of a  cure. 
Due to the fact that our analysis pertains the United States, we restrict it to the AVANT  Volume IV, Number 1/2013 www.avant.edu.pl 
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characteristics of that system. In 1970 the Congress passed a special act
192 that 
regulates the manufacture, import, possession, distribution and use of certain 
chemical substances, including medications and drugs. The substances were 
divided depending on the level of harmfulness, tendency for addiction and 
usefulness in treatment into five categories (the so-called Schedules)
193. In the 
first Schedule there are substances that are extremely harmful and very ad-
dictive, which is why they are generally illegal (their usage in experiments is 
allowed). Heroin and LSD are classified herein. Schedule II contains highly 
addictive substances, which, however, can be used in treatment if necessary. 
Schedule III consists of medications used in treatment, which do not display 
addictive tendencies, and thus do not come under strict monitoring. The insti-
tutions in USA responsible for classifying the medications into Schedules are 
the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and Food and Drug Administra-
tion (FDA). 
The majority of medications utilised as strong stimulants in the therapy of 
people  with ADHD are  classified  into Schedule  II.  The  main  stimulant pre-
scribed by psychiatrists was methylphenidate. It was first synthesised in 1944 
in  order  to  create  a  stimulant  that  would  not  be  addictive.  This  ended  in 
a failure. The chemical structure of methylphenidate and its metabolism are 
close to those of amphetamine (Diller 1998: 21). It was first approved for use 
by FDA in 1955. In the early 60s, the company Ciba-Geigy
194 started to manu-
facture and sell methylphenidate under the name of Ritalin
195. At the begin-
ning it was used in the treatment of narcolepsy, improving memory in the 
elderly, and only then in order to deal with problematic behaviour of chil-
dren. In the 90s Ritalin was most commonly prescribed to people with diag-
nosed ADHD (Diller 1998: 21). Another medication belonging to the family of 
stimulants is Adderall, produced by the Shire concern. It combines two struc-
turally different forms of amphetamine (Barkley 2006: 614-615; Diller 1998: 
268). One of the latest medications is Strattera (Barkley 2006: 38). It is not 
a stimulant, and as such it was not classified within the Schedules. It was first 
approved for market circulation in USA in 2003. 
 
 
                                                             
192  Controlled  Substances  Act  and  its  guidelines  can  be  found  on  the  DEA  webpage: 
http://www.fda.gov/RegulatoryInformation/Legislation/ucm148726.htm (DOA December 9 2009). 
193 The list of the most important and the most commonly encountered substances as well as med-
ications  and  drugs  produced  out  of  them  can  be  found  on  the  DEA  webpage: 
http://www.justice.gov/dea/pubs/scheduling.html (DOA December 9 2009). 
194 At the end of 1996 Ciba-Geigy merged Sandoz and created the pharmaceutical giant Novartis 
that now produces Ritalin.  
195 Methylphenidate is also manufactured by the company ALZA under the name Concerta. A-socio-logy of psychiatric disorder 
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The public representation of ADHD 
We have presented the consensus regarding ADHD among a broad group of 
scientists and psychiatrists. Let us now focus on the non-scientific reception of 
ADHD and its social institutionalisation. 
 
ADHD in everyday and public discourses 
ADHD is broadly represented in the everyday discourse and in the media cov-
erage. The publication of the book Driven to Distraction resulted in a wide 
social interest in the notion of ADHD. Hundreds of thousands of copies were 
sold in the USA. Within the last two decades there have been published tens of 
books presenting what ADHD is and how one deal with it
196. Partly due to the 
influence of the aforementioned publications, this disorder started to be dis-
cussed on morning shows, on talk shows and in popular glossy magazines. In 
the  mid-90s  various  authors  reproduced  scientific  and  medical  statements, 
carrying them as indisputable, established facts into public discourse. They 
mentioned the neurobiological basis of the illness and pointed to Ritalin as the 
solution  to  problems  of  attention  disorders  and  hyperactivity.  They  also 
warned that many adults may not even realise that they have ADHD (Diller 
1998:  135-137).  Following  the  publicly  presented  criteria,  people  more  and 
more  frequently  “diagnosed”  themselves  with  symptoms  of  the  disorder, 
drawing towards it the attention of their physicians. This was probably one of 
the main reasons behind a significant raise in diagnoses among US residents 
in the last decade of the 20th century – from 900 thousand in 1990 to 5 million 
at the end of the decade (Diller 1998: 2). 
ADHD has become fixed in discourse and public consciousness as an illness 
with neurological basis. This, in turn, significantly influenced various social 
processes. ADHD has become a permanent element of the theoretical frame-
work that people use to grasp the social world and other people’s activities. 
ADHD is utilised in social interactions in order to explain why others behave 
in a particular way, and also to rationalise one’s own actions, successes and 
failures to oneself. On the other hand, people who decide they have ADHD 
                                                             
196 Other popular books on ADHD addressed to a mass audience include: The Gift of ADHD: 101 
Ways to Turn Your Child’s Problem into Strengths (Honos-Web 2008); The Survival Guide for Kids 
with ADD or ADHD (Taylor 2006); Parenting Children With ADHD: 10 Lessons that Medicine Cannot 
Teach (Monastra 2004); Cory Stories: A Kid’s Book About Living With ADHD (Kraus 2004); Scattered 
Minds: A New Look At The Origins And Healing of Attention Deficit Disorder (Maté 1999); My Brain 
Needs Glasses: Living  With Hyperactivity  (Vincent  2004); Putting on the Brakes: Young  People’s 
Guide  to  Understanding  Attention  Deficit  Hyperactivity  Disorder  (Quinn  &  Stern  1992); 
Help4ADD@High School [Nadeau 1998]; The Defiant Child: A Parent’s Guide to Oppositional Defiant 
Disorder (Riley 1997); Give Your ADD Teen a Chance: A Guide for Parents of Teenagers With Atten-
tion Deficit Disorder (Weiss 1996); Change Your Brain, Change Your Life: The Breakthrough Pro-
gram for Conquering Anxiety, Depression, Obsessiveness, Anger, and Impulsiveness (Amen 1999). AVANT  Volume IV, Number 1/2013 www.avant.edu.pl 
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start to refer to themselves through the vision of the disorder as fixed in the 
discourse. People repeatedly use the concepts of ADHD so as to justify various 
behaviours. Talking about oneself this way frequently forces one to live with 
the illness and to perceive it as something positive. The increased creativity or 
the  ability  to  multitask  is  thus  emphasised  in  order  to  counterbalance  the 
negative phenomena associated with ADHD. In extreme cases, ADHD is per-
ceived in social discourse not as a disruptive illness, but as something we can 
use to our advantage in order to achieve success in life (LoPorto 2005). It hap-
pens sometimes that people use the notion of ADHD in a way that breaks its 
connotations with a pathological state.
197 
The Internet provides numerous examples of social autoidentification associ-
ated with ADHD. One can find discussion boards gathering the people suffer-
ing from ADHD
198, blogs
199, or sites that offer special techniques of dealing 
with the condition
200. 
 
ADHD support organisations 
When analysing factors that have stabilised ADHD, we cannot omit the activi-
ties  of  organised  social  groups.  There  functions  a  range  of  organisations 
whose aim is to popularise knowledge about this disorder and ways of dealing 
with it. One of them is Attention Deficit Disorder Association (ADDA), an asso-
ciation of people suffering from ADHD founded in the late 80s. Undoubtedly 
the largest, the most widely recognised and the most influential initiative fo-
cusing on the ADHD problems is Children and Adults with Attention Deficit 
Disorder  (CHADD).
201  The  organisation  was  founded  in  1987  by  a group  of 
parents whose children were struggling with this ailment; it publishes a spe-
cial bulletin called Attention! At present, CHADD counts around 20,000 mem-
bers, 2,000 of which are practising psychiatrists and other people profession-
ally dealing with ADHD patients. The most important members of CHADD are 
Edward M. Hallowell and John J. Ratey (the authors of Driven to Distraction), 
                                                             
197 For example, in Poland people more and more frequently describe themselves or others as 
“ADHDs” which, in practice, does not denote a person with a diagnosed mental disorder, but a 
person who is very dynamic, full of initiative, who “cannot sit in one place”etc. 
198 See e.g. http://www.addforums.com/forums/ , http://www.medhelp.org/forums/ADD---ADHD/show 
/313,  http://forums.about.com/n/pfx/forum.aspx?nav=messages&webtag=ab-add&lgnF=y  (DOA  De-
cember 10 2009). 
199  See  e.g.:  http://adhdguide.blogspot.com/,  http://www.myaddblog.com/,  http://www.addadhdbl 
og.com/#b6607 (DOA December 9 2009). 
200  For  example  http://www.adhdtraining.co.uk/,  http://www.adhdparenttrainer.com/php-files/view 
page.php?page_id=31 , http://adhd-add-coping-strategies.suite101.com/ (DOA December 10 2009). 
201See  the  official  webpage:  http:/www.chadd.org/  (DOA  December  10  2009);  the  initiative  was 
initially named Children with Attention Deficit Disorder; the name was changed to CHADD in 1993, 
as the group’s activity was broadened to fight ADHD in adults.  A-socio-logy of psychiatric disorder 
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Russell A. Barkley (the author of the constantly re-printed book Attention Defi-
cit Hiperactivity Disorder. A Handbook for Diagnosis and Treatment and the 
initiator of the emergence of international consensus of scientists regarding 
ADHD, which we discuss later), Alan Zametkin (the author of the first studies 
over ADHD with the use of PET). The number of members of the organisation 
and its social influence result in the fact that CHADD sets the tone of the Amer-
ican dispute on ADHD. 
It is easy to guess that CHADD accepts, following the main trends of research, 
that ADHD is an objective medical unit of genetic and neurobiological basis 
that should be treated pharmacologically. The main aims of CHADD are to 
provide latest information about progress in research over the illness and to 
advise parents of ADHD children. Another important activity is making teach-
ers aware about the nature of the illness and ways of dealing with it. 
 
Juridisation of ADHD  
Finally, it should be noted that ADHD is reinforced as a black box in the Amer-
ican  legal  system.  In  1973,  the  Congress  passed  Vocational  Rehabilitation 
Act
202, regarding persons with physical or mental disabilities. Section 504 of 
the  act  states  that  “[n]o  otherwise  qualified  handicapped  individual  in  the 
United States [...] shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from the 
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination 
under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” This act 
was later amended by such laws as the 1990 Individuals with Disabilities Edu-
cation Act (IDEA)
203. IDEA specifies special educational benefits available to 
children fulfilling its criteria. A child diagnosed with a condition listed in IDEA 
is entitled to an individual learning plan, classes and teaching techniques be-
ing adjusted to their needs, and individualised methods of assessment. At the 
very  moment  of the  law coming  into force,  CHADD  began lobbying  efforts 
aiming to have ADHD introduced on the list. These efforts came to fruition in 
1991. Since then, several schools which did not meet the requirements of IDEA 
have been brought to court by parents of schoolchildren (Diller 1998: 152). 
It is not only children with mental disorders, but adults as well. Americans 
with Disabilities Act (ADA) was passed in 1990. The Act initially referred to 
persons with physical disabilities, but in time came to include mental disabili-
ties as well, including adults diagnosed with ADHD. The Act does not regulate, 
however, the range of services to be extended for specific diseases. The way of 
dealing with adult employees with mental disorders was regulated by the fed-
                                                             
202  Full  text  of  the  act  is available  at  https://www.civilrights.dot.gov/page/rehabilitation-act-1973 
(DOA April 29 2013). 
203  Cf.  The  history  of  the  act  and  its  most  important  tenets:  http://www.ed.gov/policy/speced 
/leg/idea/history.html (DOA June 28 2013). AVANT  Volume IV, Number 1/2013 www.avant.edu.pl 
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eral agency Equal Employment Opportunity Commission  (EEOC), which set 
the guidelines for employers in 1997. EEOC points out that coming to work 
late recurrently or aversion towards other employees may stem not from in-
tentional behaviour, but from mental problems. If the issues of the employee 
exhibiting such behaviour do not affect the efficiency of their job, the employ-
ee is obligated to adapt the workplace to their employee. While EEOC guide-
lines do not refer to ADHD directly, if a person suffering from significant and 
permanent attention, concentration and behaviour disorder is diagnosed as 
suffering from ADHD, then they do meet those guidelines, and therefore may 
be entitled to special treatment. This may include: schedule adjusted to the 
needs of a given employee, sick leave, or adjusted workplace environment. 
All the aforementioned factors contribute to the fact that ADHD must be treat-
ed  as a social  actor  –  through grassroots  initiatives,  practising doctors,  the 
media and the legal system it functions as a regulator of human actions. 
 
Controversies surrounding ADHD 
We  have  shown  how  dense  the  network  of  practices  and  institutions  that 
ADHD, understood as a neurobiological mental disorder, is entwined in. When 
trying to challenge scientific findings regarding this disorder, one has to face 
not only the resistance of the research community and social organisations 
such as CHADD (which can, in support of their point of view, evoke results of 
numerous studies and statements of authorities), but also everyday  and me-
dia representations of ADHD, common practices of rationalisation and expla-
nation, or, finally, the legislative system, which establishes a dominating vi-
sion of ADHD. It turns out, however, that a number of journalists, practising 
doctors  of  medicine,  scientists  and  representatives  of  parent  communities 
challenge almost every aspect of what ADHD is
204. They criticise the diagnosis, 
way of treating, and the etiology of the illness alike. There are, finally, also 
those who refuse to consider ADHD a new medical unit. 
 
Diagnosis 
ADHD diagnosis is possibly the subject of the greatest controversies in medical 
society.  In  his  book  Running  on  Ritalin,  Lawrence  H.  Diller  enumerates 
a number of problems connected with diagnosing ADHD (Diller 1998: 60-65). 
Firstly, he draws attention to the fact that entering illnesses to or removing 
them from the list is very frequently dictated by factors other than “scientific 
                                                             
204 Those critical of the dominating paradigm are also engaged in organised activities; they organ-
ise societies, create discussion boards and Internet portals, where they share information and 
present their opinions. This, in particular, pertains to parents who focus on the negative conse-
quences of pharmacological therapy of ADHD. A-socio-logy of psychiatric disorder 
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objectivity.” He provides the example of homosexuality, which DSM contained 
as a mental disorder until 1974 – it was political factors that decided about its 
removals, not scientific research. Secondly, formulating diagnostic guidelines 
is, to a large degree, open to interpretation – different doctors may diagnose 
the same cases in different ways. Problems may arise, for example, while es-
timating the frequency and intensity of undesirable behaviour (for instance: 
Does a child’s wriggling when he/she sits is so intensive that it can be consid-
ered a symptom from a DSM list?), and the very list of symptoms necessary for 
a diagnosis (Is a patient who strongly displays five instead of six symptoms 
healthy?) Thirdly, there exist no objective indicators, other than outside symp-
toms, that would point to the occurrence of the disorder. Despite neurobiolog-
ical and genetic research, scientists did not manage to construct unambiguous 
clinical tests. In other words, many people (including practising doctors) are 
surprised by the fact that it is officially stated that ADHD is a condition with 
a neurobiological basis, while in practice, it is tested by the means of behav-
ioural tests. 
At the same time, it is emphasised that the DSM list of criterions was supposed 
to fulfill auxiliary functions, yet it is treated like a diagnostic test. Fourthly, 
although DSM-IV-TR states that the symptoms must occur in at least two envi-
ronments, in practice it is most frequently the same people making observa-
tions in both environments, for instance, the parents or the patients them-
selves. The doctor is forced to rely on their statements, which by themselves 
may be utterly subjective and distorted. The fifth point to be made here is that 
diagnoses  generally  do  not  take  into  consideration  environmental  factors, 
such as the characteristics of familial relations, which may be key in cases of 
children with heightened levels of activity and dispersed attention. The sixth 
is that diagnostic criteria are overly inclusive. This objection is partly a result 
of the aforementioned problems. When no conclusive tests exist and the diag-
nostic criteria are open to interpretation, the risk is that the condition will be 
marginalised or diagnosed too often. In the case of ADHD, the critics point to 
the latter option. As new statistical manuals have been published, the num-
bers of diagnosed cases of ADHD have risen consistently and, consequently, so 
have the production and consumption of appropriate medications. The sev-
enth point is that the criteria formulated in DSM may very well apply to other 
conditions described as discrete units in the manual, such as obsessive com-
pulsive disorder (OCD) or oppositional defiant disorder (ODD).  
The above problems may be directly referred to medical practice dilemmas. 
As the sociologist Adam Rafalovich points out (2005), the case of ADHD consti-
tutes an example of the problem of uncertainty faced by doctors in everyday 
practice. Rafalovich shows the chasm between the theoretical academic dis-
putes and the perspective of practising doctors. The latter not only approach 
patients in a different way but, most importantly, exhibit scepticism in rela-
tion  to  the  existing  guidelines,  which  are  prepared  by  “the  academics,”  as AVANT  Volume IV, Number 1/2013 www.avant.edu.pl 
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a result of encountering specific cases. The question of ambivalence and nego-
tiation is particularly striking where mental disorders and DSM guidelines are 
concerned.  Rafalovich  conducted  interviews  with  twenty-six  professionals 
(psychiatrists,  educators,  pediatricians  and  psychologists)  dealing  with  per-
sons  suffering  from  ADHD.  Twenty-four  of  the  interviewees  in  their  state-
ments expressed doubts and fears regarding the methods of diagnosing and 
treating ADHD. Most of them confirmed differences and inconsistencies be-
tween the etiology of ADHD derived from DSM-IV and specific cases of the 
condition. The difficulty stems partly from the fact that the eighteen criteria 
listed by DSM-IV are not divided into biological and environmental ones. Doc-
tors fairly often make the distinction on their own, dividing ADHD into prima-
ry (neurological) and secondary (social/environmental). One of the interview-
ees stated that only the former is “true” ADHD. Many among them believed 
that it is not enough to simply count the symptoms according to the DSM-IV 
guidelines  –  more  detailed  and  time-consuming  observations must  be  con-
ducted. DSM-IV constitutes an introductory guide, but it does not exhaust the 
multiplicity of factors that they face where ADHD is concerned. One of the 
respondents expressed the awareness of the changeability of the ADHD defini-
tion in the following words: “I really think that ADHD is a garbage can diagno-
sis. … I wouldn’t be surprised if we see the diagnosis changed within the next 
couple of years” (Rafalovich 2005: 311). Some respondents rejected DSM-IV 
wholesale, as it did not fit their approach to the patient. Eighteen of the inter-
viewees  remained  unconvinced  by  the  neuro-biological  explanations.  They 
could not provide their own answers as to the cause of ADHD. The answers 
provided by the remaining professionals differed significantly from one an-
other – the explanations ranged from experiencing trauma in the child’s life to 
brain defects. Many of the participants asserted that there is no consensus as 
to what ADHD is. Such perspectives denote ADHD as a disease “in process,” 
the origins of which have yet to be entirely understood. (Rafalovich 2005: 312) 
In spite of those reservations, using DSM-IV is mandated by legal and bureau-
cratic factors. It appears that thanks to basing diagnosis on the manual, it is 
possible to obtain coverage of the costs of treatment. In the words of one of 
the women psychiatrists taking part in the study, “Insurance companies like to 
get some kind of diagnosis, and the plain fact is that they do cover ADHD, or 
just about anything in it [referring to the contents of DSM-IV ]. I guess you 
might say there is a pressure to use the letters ‘A-D-H-D’, so that we can move 
ahead and get a kid treated” (Rafalovich 2005: 313). If the diagnosis is not 
based on DSM-IV, chances are that the cost of treatment will rise exponential-
ly. Such conditions constitute institutional incentives to positively diagnose 
ADHD and it may result in an overly large number of cases. Furthermore, 
clients may have reasons to believe that a misdiagnosis is in their best inter-
est, as it ensures coverage of the costs of treatment (Kirk & Kutchins 1992: 
240). A-socio-logy of psychiatric disorder 
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Perhaps the most substantial allegations against the dominant paradigm con-
cern gradual expanding of the ADHD category to include an increasingly large 
group of potential patients. This process has taken place in two ways: firstly, 
the category has included more and more children, and secondly, the condi-
tion has been “broadened” to other age groups. As a result, an increasingly 
large  group  of people  were  diagnosed  with ADHD.  This happened  through 
small modifications to one after another diagnostic criterion written into the 
DSM.  To  give  an  example,  the  addition  of  situations  in  which  symptoms 
should be observed meant that a person capable of focusing on work but dis-
tracted in interpersonal relations or during partaking in entertainment could 
be diagnosed positively. The category has embraced more and more children’s 
behaviours that previously were not treated as symptoms of mental disorders. 
Additionally, hyperactivity and attention disorders were combined. Definition 
changes led to the fact that children who were not diagnosed as “hyperkinet-
ic” according to DSM-II may be considered in such terms according to DSM-III. 
(Conrad, Potter 2000: 563-564).  
As  a  result  of  reconceptualisations  introduced  in  DSM-IV,  the  number  of 
ADHD diagnoses rapidly rose; Mark Wolraich and his team conducted a study 
(Woolraich et al., 1995) on a group of 1077 children (aged 5 to 12 years). The 
subjects were diagnosed using DSM-IV and then DSM-III. In the same group, 
9.6% of patients were classified as patients with ADHD according to DSM-III 
and 17.8% of the patients according to DSM-IV. Moreover, the medical catego-
ry was broadened to include adults, which additionally increased the number 
of diagnosed cases. Presumably, in addition to that, such phenomena as self-
diagnoses also appeared among patients influenced by public representations 
of the condition who would pressure their doctors with expectations of a spe-
cific diagnostic pronouncement. 
The gradual expansion of the inclusiveness of the ADHD category constitutes 
one of the many symptoms of increasing medicalisation (Williams & Calnan 
1996). This process consists in broadening boundaries of definitions and med-
ical  practice.  Medicalisation  in  the  case  of  ADHD  does  not  only  concern 
broadening  of  the  diagnostic  category.  We  should  also  remember  that  the 
very spread of ADHD category results in a certain type of human behaviour 
being made into a strictly medical problem (Conrad & Potter 2000). 
 
Etiology 
Unequivocal ascertainment of what ADHD is constitutes another important 
sphere of controversy as well. Officially ADHD is held to be a congenital neu-
robiologically-based  condition.  We  have  already  mentioned  various  neuro-
physiological and genetic studies referred to by the supporters of a natural-
istic account of the condition. Many of those “findings” have emerged as sub-AVANT  Volume IV, Number 1/2013 www.avant.edu.pl 
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ject of controversy. Three areas in the etiology of ADHD can be delineated in 
connection to problematisation within those discussions. Firstly, the naturalist 
account itself had a long history rife with various definitions of the condition 
and various attempts at explaining its causes. This has a negative impact on 
the evaluation of the reliability of these explanations and puts the very status 
of the condition in doubt. Obviously, in light of normative scientific methodol-
ogy, the changeability of a notion or definition does not deprive it of legitima-
cy. Nonetheless, from the perspective of laypersons or practising physicians 
the historical changeability of the definition and description of ADHD influ-
ences negatively the reliability of the prevalent paradigm. We are therefore in 
a situation where physicians are to accept a new medical unit characterised 
by a long history of re-definitions and explanations that came to be consid-
ered  incorrect,  which,  in  addition,  constitutes  a  combination  of  conditions 
previously considered to be separate units. 
The second issue concerns the conclusiveness of contemporary neurobiologi-
cal and genetic research. This is of key importance. The legitimacy of the bio-
logical paradigm in explaining ADHD is based on the aforementioned studies 
from the 90s. The critique of neurophysiological studies focuses, above all, on 
the issue of experiment reliability and presumed overinterpretation. The au-
thors were criticised for too small experimental samples (Timimi and 33 Co-
endorsers 2004: 60), the lack of unequivocal proof of the existence of mean-
ingful pathology in brain function and confusing the cause and effect (it is 
possible that ADHD causes changes in the brain rather than the other way 
round)  (Baumeister  &  Hawkins    2001).  It  has  also  been  pointed  out  that 
changed brain function may be the result of ADHD treatment. As it turned out, 
most neurophysiological studies were carried out on persons who had previ-
ously been treated pharmacologically (Leo & Cohen 2003). Genetic tests have 
also been criticised through pointing out some areas of result overinterpreta-
tion. It is, for instance, highlighted that family cases do not take into consider-
ation environmental factors which are the same for all family members (Jo-
seph 2000). It is also the case that there is no proof whatsoever pointing to 
ADHD being caused by a specific gene (Diller 1998: 110).  
A third sphere of controversy around naturalist etiology is pointing to such 
alternative explanations for ADHD causes which are associated with the out-
side environment. In the early 1970s the pediatrician Benjamin Feingold, spe-
cialising  in  treating  allergies, hypothesised  that  child  hyperactivity  may  be 
attributed to inappropriate diet. Symptoms related to ADHD were to be caused 
by consuming preservatives, sweeteners or flavour enhancers. Feingold com-
posed a special diet which eliminated these factors. A second, currently quite 
popular, alternative explanation of the causes of ADHD regards the state of 
contemporary culture. Too high expectations towards growing children, cul-
tural acceleration or lack of moral authorities capable of “tempering” prob-A-socio-logy of psychiatric disorder 
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lematic behaviour
205 are all mentioned in this context. The third explanation 
focuses on typically sociological factors. It is argued that the cause of ADHD 
may be related to the disturbed social structure and social roles, connected, 
for instance, with rising numbers of divorces and passive participation in fam-
ily life. At the same time, it is said that paying attention to children may influ-
ence the development of their cognitive faculties, and relegating children to 
being cared for outside the home environment may impact them negatively 
(Diller 1998: 77-78). 
 
Therapy 
Controversies  arising  around  treatment  may  be  partly  considered  to  stem 
from  the  ambiguities  surrounding  diagnosis  and  etiology.  Pharmacological 
treatment fits naturalist explanations for ADHD (since the condition is congen-
ital and biologically-motivated, it should be treated with the use of substances 
that influence the organism directly). ADHD is typically treated with Schedule 
II substances, which may worry persons pointing to the ambiguity of the crite-
ria, excessive inclusiveness of the definition or the danger of overdiagnosis. It 
should not, therefore, come as a surprise that the opponents rejecting natural-
ist explanations or challenging the legitimacy of diagnostic procedures typical-
ly attack also the dominant mode of treatment. 
Again, several problematised issues may be noticed. Considering the fact that 
in  the  US  pharmacological  treatment  is prevalent  in  cases  of persons  with 
ADHD, all problematic issues will concern stimulants as such. Firstly, the high 
addictivity of these substances is frequently mentioned. This is particularly 
true for Ritalin, which has been singled out by the DEA. Cases of severe addic-
tion  have  been  noted. The  existence  of  groups  selling  the  drug  illegally as 
a narcotic substitute has been confirmed. This is especially true for students 
who resell the drug to each other as performance-enhancer for studying. The 
drug is ingested similarly to cocaine – the pill is crushed and then inhaled na-
sally. In 1995, two fatal cases attributed to this drug were noted in the United 
States. According to DEA reports, Ritalin is listed among top ten most frequent-
ly stolen medicines in the US. It is not irrelevant that in the USA the produc-
tion and consumption of Ritalin is five times higher than in the rest of the 
world. The amount has in fact multiplied sixfold between 1990 and 1995
206. 
Secondly,  according  to  many  specialists,  Ritalin  and  other  stimulants  may 
cause a number of side effects. Biological (stunted growth and weight gain in 
growing children, loss of appetite, headaches, stomach pain, eyesight prob-
                                                             
205 Sami Tamimi is one of the representatives of the cultural perspective (2001). 
206 Cf. http://www.justice.gov/dea/pubs/pressrel/pr951020.htm (DOA November 17 2009). Cf. also the 
full DEA report from 1995: http://www.methylphenidate.net/ (DOA December 15 2009).  AVANT  Volume IV, Number 1/2013 www.avant.edu.pl 
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lems,  heart  problems,  hallucinations,  liver  problems)
207,  as  well  as  psycho-
social consequences are listed here among possible ones (cf. Breggin 1992). 
Thirdly, the effectiveness of stimulants as medicines is very limited. It was 
noted in 1978 already that stimulants affect persons diagnosed with hyperac-
tivity and attention deficits in exactly the same way as they do persons with-
out those problems. Research led under Judith Rapport (Rapport et al. 1978) 
from National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) consisted in administering 
the  stimulant  to  a group  of hyperactive  and  non-hyperactive  children  (the 
report analysed Dexedrine, another drug used in treating ADHD, rather than 
Ritalin). The effect was identical: improved attention and better educational 
and task-related performance were noticed in both groups. The effect of the 
medicine did not relate to typical symptoms in a way that would suggest that 
those  symptoms  were  particular.  From  a  pharmacological  perspective,  no 
difference was detectable between healthy and allegedly ill individuals. This 
belies  two  important  questions: (1)  Stimulants  undoubtedly  work,  but  is  it 
possible to determine that they treat ADHD? (2) How many people may want 
to obtain a diagnosis that makes it possible to legally use Schedule II, meth-
amphetamine-based drugs that improve work or school performance? 
Fourthly, it is frequently said that stimulants do not treat the cause of the con-
dition but merely alleviate the symptoms temporarily. In other words, Ritalin 
does not treat the pathogen in the body. Once treatment stops, the symptoms 
reappear (Diller 1998: 44). 
As a fifth point it should be mentioned that the critics of the dominant para-
digm point to alternative, not as popular, ways of treating hyperactivity and 
attention deficits. This predominantly refers to behavioural training of vari-
ous  kinds,  combined  with  individual  approach  to  treating  the  above-
mentioned  problems.  One  such  method  is  cognitive  behavioural  therapy 
(CBT). It is a multi-faceted approach that teaches the patient specific behav-
iours, which in the case of ADHD means, for instance, the ability to focus at-
tention on one subject, sitting still, etc. CBT may consist of role-playing, study-
ing from a textbook or completing an established sequence of actions (Diller 
1998: 223). Another approach is to arrange group sessions with patient’s fami-
ly members or peers. This may consist in learning self-control in social envi-
ronment through a reward and punishment system. In the United States, spe-
cial summer camps are organised specialising in psychosocial treatment of 
ADHD
208. A number of techniques have also been developed that are used in 
adapting the environment to best foster the sick individual. This predominant-
                                                             
207  Cf.  http://www.psych.org/Share/Parents-Med-Guide/Medication-Guides/ParentsMedGuide-ADHD-
English.aspx , especially pages 9-10 (DOA December 15 2009). 
208 Cf. http://circ-uab.infomedia.com/content.asp?id=98821 (DOA December 16 2009). A-socio-logy of psychiatric disorder 
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ly concerns schools carrying out special educational programs for ADHD chil-
dren. 
All the above mentioned alternative ways of treating ADHD need not exclude 
pharmacological treatment. The supporters of psychosocial and behavioural 
approaches are mostly pointing to the danger of one-sided reliance on Ritalin, 
rather than negating the need for it whatsoever. For instance, Lawrence H. 
Diller, the author of the aforementioned Running on Ritalin, uses pharmaco-
logical measures in his medical practice even as he considers their abuse to be 
a negative phenomenon. The controversy surrounding Ritalin does not consist 
in it lacking any medical use, but in it being presented and promoted as the 
only effective ADHD drug in spite of the existence of alternative treatment 
methods. 
 
ADHD and disease mongering 
The problem of promoting stimulants leads us to the last area of controversy, 
which is perhaps the most significant one. This refers to the relationship be-
tween pharmaceutical companies producing the most popular ADHD medi-
cines and the associations uniting patients. Let us refer to a specific situation. 
In  1995,  DEA  published  the  aforementioned  report  on  Ritalin
209,  commis-
sioned in response to the CHADD appeal to have the drug moved from Sched-
ule II to Schedule III. Such a change would practically come down to lessened 
control over the consumption and production of the drug. The report revealed 
that CHADD failed to sufficiently inform its members about the very possible 
risk of addiction or the dangers the medicine poses to health. On the contrary, 
it claimed Ritalin to be a substance causing little harm, and without any side 
effects. The report also stated that between 1991 and 1994 the company pro-
ducing Ritalin – Ciba-Geigy – donated $748,000 to CHADD.  In turn, in 1993 and 
1994, when the company experienced shortages of Ritalin due to increased 
demand
210,  the  members  of  CHADD  lobbied  congresspeople  they  were  ac-
quainted with, who, in turn, approached DEA more than 135 times to increase 
the limits placed on the production. 
As a result of the report’s publication, the plan to move Ritalin to Schedule II 
was abandoned. A second consequence was a suit filed by ADHD children’s 
parents against the American Psychiatric Association and Novartis pharma-
ceutical company (formerly Ciba-Geigy). They alleged a conspiracy formed in 
order  to  artificially  create  demand  for  stimulants.  As  the  complainants 
                                                             
209 Cf. http://www.methylphenidate.net/ (DOA December 16 2009). 
210 Due to the fact that Ritalin can be found in Schedule II, it is controlled with regard to its pro-
duction as well. In practice, this means that its manufacturer cannot exceed a certain quota of 
stored substance imposed by the DEA. Moving Ritalin to Schedule III would result in a situation in 
which the company would not need to bother with production bans imposed from the above. AVANT  Volume IV, Number 1/2013 www.avant.edu.pl 
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claimed, the pharmaceutical companies have a decisive influence on APA’s 
actions, which they lobby in order to inflate the production of medications 
(Charatan  2000:  723).  There  were  several  such  lawsuits,  however,  none  of 
them ended with a verdict which would threaten pharmaceutical companies 
or medical institutions. 
The above accusations are connected with a larger trend in criticism lodged 
against the actions  of pharmaceutical  concerns  and associated  doctors  and 
scientists. More and more often, journalists, as well as doctors, begin to write 
about the phenomenon of disease mongering (cf. Applbaum 2006; Healy 2006; 
Heath 2006; Moynihan, David 2006; Payer 1992; Pettersen 2008; Phillips 2006; 
Tiefer 2006; cf. also “PR Watch” 2003, Vol. 10, no. 1). As part of this trend, 
journalists, doctors and scientists accused the companies of promoting not so 
much drugs as diseases themselves. The argument used here states that, in 
order  to  maximise  profits,  companies  create  markets  by  “publicising”  new 
diseases, making diseases out of risk factors or “promoting” old conditions, so 
far considered to be harmless or marginal. According to Ray Moynihan and 
Alan Cassels, the authors of Selling Sickness (Moynihan & Cassels 2005), dis-
ease mongering can be connected, for instance, to (1) high cholesterol, which 
is now popularly considered to be the main cause of heart attack, (2) depres-
sion, which has become an exceedingly wide category, or such “diseases” as 
(3) premenstrual dysphoric disorder or (4) menopause. As the proponents of 
the term claim, pharmaceutical companies use PR and marketing techniques 
in order to publicise and create only those diseases for which they already 
have medicines on offer.   
ADHD has been listed among such “promoted” diseases (Moynihan & Cassels 
2005: 61-81). The critics of disease mongering have pointed to the campaigns 
promoting fighting ADHD with Ritalin and to the financing of the organisation 
by pharmaceutical companies. The authors do not suggest that in the case of 
ADHD the companies created a false grassroots initiative
211; it is rather that 
through directing the flow of financial support they are capable of promoting 
certain ideas and to position various opinions and content in the public dis-
course (such a type of wielding influence over the media and the discourse 
can be referred to as agenda-setting [McCombs & Shaw 1972]). 
 
Attempts to close the controversy 
The controversies around ADHD have involved journalists, practising doctors 
of medicine and researchers, as well as regular people. Some openly criticise 
mainstream research while others limit their input to expressing doubts or 
                                                             
211 As critics of disease mongering show, false grassroots initiatives often are in fact veiled promo-
tional campaigns and have been used in a number of other diseases. A-socio-logy of psychiatric disorder 
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formulating alternative suggestions. The opponents of the dominant paradigm 
express their doubts not only through academic papers or in the media, but 
also with the use of legal resources. However, the existence of signals of re-
sistance does not suffice to talk about controversy in the sociological meaning 
of the word. In order for this situation to constitute a controversy, the repre-
sentatives of the opposing sides should try to subvert, discredit or refute each 
other’s claims. To this end, they reinforce their own “circulation mode” and 
attempt to make it more difficult for their opposition to mobilise heterogenic 
resources. This can involve, among others, attempts to subvert the credibility 
of the translations formulated by the opponents, but can also take the form of 
blocking access to economic or social resources. 
Within this context, one of the most important episodes in the controversy 
may be found in the discussion which took place between 2002 and 2004 on 
the pages of Clinical Child and Family Psychology Review. The year 2002 marks 
the publication of International Consensus Statement on ADHD, a document 
initiated  by  Richard  Barkley  and  signed  by  over  80  specialists  (primarily 
Americans), directed against the supporters of the theory that ADHD is a prob-
lematic and ill-defined medical unit. In the text one can find the articulation 
of  the  dominant  paradigm  regarding  ADHD,  which  we  have  reconstructed 
within this paper. The authors do not just criticise the theories of the oppo-
nents, but accuse them of acting against public’s best health interests, empha-
sising the dangers associated with ADHD. 
In March 2004, on Sami Timimi’s initiative,  the same periodical published the 
article A Critique of the International Statement on ADHD (Timimi and 33 Co-
endorsers  2004),  cosigned  by  33  other  researchers.  The  authors  point  to 
a number of debatable points, for instance: the lack of a final proof whether 
ADHD is attributable to neurobiological or metabolic factors; the differences 
in the number of the person suffering depending on culture, country or even 
region of a country; and unclear definition of the condition, including other 
disorders within itself. In criticising the neurophysiological account, the re-
searchers refer to the opinion published by American National Institute of 
Health in 1998, which states that there is no sufficient proof to connect the 
condition to a biochemical brain dysfunction. Due to focusing on naturalist 
explanations, environmental influence is entirely overlooked or even negated. 
The authors also quote the aforementioned doubts regarding treatment. As 
they suggest, drug therapy alone can discourage from undertaking more de-
manding, yet more effective CBT methods. Finally, the authors propose adopt-
ing a cultural perspective on ADHD. 
The same issue of the journal included a comment by Barkley (2004). The au-
thor points to mistakes in quoting made by the critics of the dominant para-
digm and to the fact that opposing the official ADHD definitions has little bear-
ing and belongs outside the scientific and medical mainstream. The critics of AVANT  Volume IV, Number 1/2013 www.avant.edu.pl 
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ADHD lack any criteria differentiating acquired and congenital disorders, the 
latter of which may be universal for all people. Moreover, the authors who 
criticise ADHD quote a paper which does allow for the possibility of ADHD 
being  associated  with  biological  factors,  and  does  not  unequivocally  prove 
ADHD to be caused by child sexual molestation, as the critics would have it. 
Furthermore, Barkley claims that if the suggestions of ADHD critics were to be 
followed,  other diseases,  such as  Parkinson’s,  would also  fail  to  meet  their 
criteria. Barkey refutes the argument regarding the differences in severity or 
the course of the condition in different cultures or societies – he shows that it 
means  neither  that  ADHD  does  not  exist,  nor  that  it  lacks  neurobiological 
causes. Where the argument against neuroimaging studies is concerned, Bar-
kley cites a study that compares the images of persons who were and were not 
treated for ADHD. He opposes the cultural explanation of ADHD, stating that 
there is no proof for the veracity of this theory. He points to studies done on 
twins,  showing  that  environmental factors  are  less  influential than genetic 
ones. 
As sociology and philosophy of science show, such debates may last forever – 
new research can be quoted and subsequent logical or methodological errors 
can be pointed out. Arguments focusing on the issue cannot convince people 
who function within different, incompatible paradigms and cannot end the 
controversy on their own. A second issue which we need to pay attention to is 
that each officially accepted fact regarding ADHD has been publically under-
mined. Thirdly, public statements by mainstream researchers may be inter-
preted as an attempt to close the position authoritatively. However, as can be 
observed, the opponents refuse to have arguments along the lines of Roma 
locuta, causa finita used against them. Finally, let us turn to the statement 
which is placed in between issue-related arguments, namely: the claim that 
the opponents do not belong to the mainstream of ADHD research. Is it not 
“social proof”? The paradox revealed by ANT should be noted here – Barkley 
refuses to attribute importance to critical voices, yet the very fact that he must 
dispute them accords them such importance. As studies on modality in science 
show, having one’s thesis radically criticised is better for authors than having 
it ignored. This is the manner in which critical approaches opposing dominant 
paradigms are usually treated. In this case, however, the critical voice is too 
strong for the mainstream researchers to remain passive. 
Critical researchers do not only refer to already existing research outcomes 
which they interpret differently. They also strive to do their own research, 
among other things – into cultural factors influencing ADHD. In other words, 
they do not only try to “make over” the world mobilised by the dominant par-
adigm so that it will accept their theories, but they also create their own inde-
pendent chains of translations. A-socio-logy of psychiatric disorder 
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It should, however, be remembered that the groups contesting mainstream 
research do not limit themselves to action within the loop of “mobilising the 
world,” and their criticism and attempts to create alternative paradigms also 
involve  attempts  to  mobilise  resources  in  the  remaining  three  loops.  Once 
more, cognitive and issue-related aspects are interwoven with group interests, 
public representation and reactions of the academic community. 
One more strategy used in the ADHD dispute is worth noting. Let us begin 
with the following example. As we remember, research done with PET imag-
ing showed differences in brain metabolism in persons with ADHD. This re-
search was then undermined by pointing to the too small sample and the pos-
sibility that the observed results were the artifact of using medications by the 
persons in the experimental group. This is why the research was repeated, to 
dispel controversy (cf. Ernst et al. 1994; Zametkin et al. 1993). The first results, 
however, were not confirmed. The subsequent studies, which did not fit the 
dominant discourse, were ignored and absent from the media. Let us, howev-
er, pay attention to the official standpoint of the Center for Disease Control 
and Prevention, which is that “the causes and risk factors of ADHD are un-
known, but current research shows that genetics plays an important role.”
212 
Is that not in opposition to official declarations of mainstream researchers 
who claim that key aspects of ADHD have already been scientifically proven? 
Moreover,  in  spite  of  numerous  disputes  which  mobilised  mainstream  re-
searchers  to  proof  their  theories,  no  new,  revolutionary  results  have  been 
found that would allow them to ultimately silence the critical voices. 
Let us however note the irony of the entire situation. It is highly probable that 
the very controversy around ADHD has substantially contributed to making 
the knowledge about the condition more common in public discourse. Even 
negative modalities to some limited extent contribute to objectivisation of the 
hypotheses. In this case, we encounter the effect of reversal: by formulating 
their accusations to question alleged facts, critics ultimately reinforced public 
representation of ADHD, contributing to closing it all the more fully in the 
form of a black box (Conrad & Potter 2000: 571) 
 
Conclusion: how to manage controversies around the definition of a dis-
order 
The case of ADHD illustrates a number of patterns in functioning of science as 
observed by sociologists. In the research process we do not face self-evident 
results and proofs. Experimental data and results of observation do not speak 
for themselves, nor do they solve automatically controversial questions. The 
results of translations must be interwoven into a complex network of factors 
                                                             
212 http://www.cdc.gov/ncbddd/adhd/facts.html (DOA November 19 2009) AVANT  Volume IV, Number 1/2013 www.avant.edu.pl 
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and skillfully articulated in order to gain the assigned power of persuasion. 
Just as there are no scientific facts that speak for themselves, so there are no 
diseases that objectively impose themselves on us. That people die, suffer and 
feel unwell is a perceptually accessible, culturally universal fact. However, the 
answer to the question of the reasons for their suffering and of what their 
disease is remains the effect of actions by various processes and social institu-
tions. In our culture it is medicine that most of all organises social experience 
associated with this sphere, determining what diseases a given person suf-
fered from and why, as well as what the cause of death was. Therefore, we 
can speak of unorganised experience of disease on the one hand, and of strict 
classifications, diagnoses and treatments culturally organising illness, on the 
other (Conrad & Potter 2000: 559-560). 
The  appearance  of  subsequent  frames  organising  our  perception  of  illness 
constitutes a symptom of increasing medicalisation. In the case of ADHD we 
were facing not only the medicalisation of certain spheres of experience (hy-
peractive  children,  non-satisfactory results  of  employees, difficulty  forming 
social relations) but, most of all, the attempt to make the definition of the dis-
order more inclusive. Diagnoses and their criteria themselves were the result 
of action not only of scientific factors – they were the effect of a heterogeneous 
entanglement in the form of grassroots initiatives, patient self-diagnoses, pub-
lic imaginings regarding ADHD, pharmaceutical companies’ interests, teenag-
ers  looking  for  “legal  drugs”,  the  results  of  PET  and  MRI  research,  etc.  It 
should, however, be noted that in many cases science has lost control over the 
process of defining what ADHD is. In some cases we faced a process of a cer-
tain  demedicalisation,  where  laypersons  appropriating  the  ADHD  category 
deprived it of current medical connotations, treating it not as a pathology or 
a disease but a condition advantageous from a professional or social perspec-
tive. 
The processes and factors described in this article have vital consequences, 
and the ADHD resulting from them may be treated as an actor in ANT mean-
ing of the word. First and foremost, the construct in question influences hu-
man self-presentation. It also influences the manner in which a given person 
is treated by their social environment and institutions. ADHD diagnosis entails 
treatment with the use of strong pharmaceuticals, which seems to be a serious 
consequence. Most importantly, however, attention should be paid to the in-
dividual experience of the illness by the sick person – it appears to be mediat-
ed by a number of advocates, institutions, technologies and discursive practic-
es. 
Obviously, the practices described above stem from the conviction that ADHD 
as such exists. How can we refer, therefore, to the controversies we have re-
constructed here? What can we do when a large number of people dispute the 
existence  of  this  disorder,  or  at  the  very  least  –  its  etiology  or  diagnostic A-socio-logy of psychiatric disorder 
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measures? Do we not need to accept some ontological assumptions regarding 
ADHD when describing the controversies above? Do we not need to accept 
certain assumptions regarding social actors, and in particular, does there not 
exist the need to ascribe to them interests determining the standpoints they 
represent? By undertaking to analyse the controversy surrounding treatment, 
diagnosis and the status of ADHD we need not refer to ascribed interests, “so-
ciology of error” or take on some notion about the objective status of reality, 
which  specific actors  represent to  a  lesser  or greater  degree  of credibility. 
Instead of looking for a reference point in the form of objective world “out 
there”, we can be satisfied with describing what we capture with case studies, 
discourse analysis, ethnographical studies or other methods belonging to the 
field of social sciences. 
Accessing an unmediated world, which would solve controversies, is impossi-
ble – we are always translating the world. Accepting such a position does not, 
however,  mean  subscribing  to  a kind  of  relativism  or  idealism  that  would 
make it impossible for us to make binding decisions and take practical action. 
After all, actors are always negotiating the hierarchy and credibility of trans-
lations, but they do so not so much in reference to the objective world, as in 
reference to numerous areas of socio-technological networks. ANT proposes 
not just a certain descriptive methodology, but it also points to ways in which 
inconclusiveness and ambiguity, which characterise expert opinions and sci-
entific knowledge in late modernity, can be managed. Furthermore, ANT may 
constitute a point of departure for formulating practical recommendations. 
It is usually conceded that objective reality should be the regulator of social 
action and the factor that solves controversies. The problem is that in the cas-
es of controversies everybody claims to have objective reality “on their side.” 
As ANT demonstrates, the world does not constitute the reason for solving 
a conflict, but rather its result (Latour 1987: 60-61, 259) – the generally accept-
ed model of the world reveals itself only as a result of the interweaving of 
heterogeneous factors and the closing of black boxes. Can then traditionally 
understood objective truth serve as a regulator of social activity? Of course 
many will refrain from giving a negative answer, formulating a question in its 
place: “What can ANT offer instead?”, “What else but scientific truth protects 
us from the attempts of interest groups striving to shape the discourse and 
knowledge according to their aims?” or “What else but the truth will let us 
take effective action?” 
In order to answer this question we suggest referring to the question of de-
mocracy. Let us assume that the effectiveness of the democratic system is not 
dependent on the inexistence of particular interests striving to influence pow-
er.  On  the  contrary,  as  new  institutional  economics  suggests  (Menard  & 
Shirley [eds.] 2005), including the theory of public choice (Wilkin [ed.] 2005), 
the success of democracy rests precisely on the actions undertaken by indi-AVANT  Volume IV, Number 1/2013 www.avant.edu.pl 
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viduals to fulfill their egoistic goals. On the one hand, this concerns politicians, 
whose egoistic interests, through various institutions, including elections and 
media control, become connected to the public interest – in order to gain prof-
its, a politician must at least convince others that he is acting in the interests 
of  wide  social  groups.  This  also  concerns  groups  of  interest  attempting  to 
shape institutional frameworks so as to gain the advantage in the games they 
play (economic, political, legal etc.). If striving to exert influence is universal 
and  equally distributed  among  the  actors,  then, in  summary, their  egoistic 
goals may be compatible with effective allocation of resources, and – in other 
words – should result in a just and effective system. Problems such as political 
corruption or the distortions of market mechanisms typically arise only when 
the ability to influence state institutions is highly concentrated. States gov-
erned by concentrated interests more rarely undertake reforms which could 
improve the quality of governance and, at the same time, limit the distortions 
and restrictions within an economy which allows interest groups to draw pri-
vate profits at the expense of public interest (Hellman & Kaufmann 2002). In 
other words, in the light of such an approach it is not the justness of opinions 
and interests of particular actors, their motivation or morality they are guided 
by that carries the primary importance, but the institutional context within 
which they function. This involves both regulations fighting monopolies (both 
in the economic and political context) and institutions of social control. 
A similar manner of thinking can be used to manage research conflicts, in-
cluding  ones arising  around  disease  definitions and treatments.  Let us  not 
focus on objective truth or methodological standards, which – as we have seen 
–  cannot  solve  such  scientific  debates  on  their  own.  Let  us  instead  worry 
about the institutional context of the controversy. This is not only about mak-
ing it possible for varied interest groups referring to their own translations to 
be able to communicate without interruption. By no means are we suggesting 
that  scientific  truth  should  be  subject  to  political  vote,  where  the  majority 
would decide about how the world is constructed. It is rather about establish-
ing  institutional  mechanisms  that  would  reveal  the  entanglements  of 
knowledge  we  have  described  here.  This  is  important  because  when 
knowledge is perceived as “entangled”, it does not immediately spread across 
discourse  and  social  practice (as,  significantly, the  denial  of knowledge  re-
garding its social history constitutes an element of the process of closing a 
black box). Why should such processes be countered? ADHD exemplifies this 
well – a controversial, diagnostically ambiguous condition was allowed to gain 
institutional status. However, such knowledge is not innocent; the dominant 
definition of ADHD may generate a number of social harms (overdiagnosis, 
dangerous treatment, harmful social stigma). Moreover, mainstream scientists 
have largely lost control over the definition of the condition and even should 
they try to revise or undermine it now, it would be impossible due to process-A-socio-logy of psychiatric disorder 
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es  related  to  its  public  representation  and  institutionalisation.  ADHD  has 
gained a life of its own. 
Obviously, we are touching upon socially precarious questions – any subject 
connected to health is irritable and morally fortified. Both health and life con-
stitute some of the most important values in our culture. But can referring to 
them  ultimately  enforce  agreement  within  a  conflict?  After  all,  opponents, 
much as the proponents of the dominant paradigm, claim to be representing 
our interest where health is concerned. Moreover, they accuse their adver-
saries of acting against public health. It is important to mention that in key 
moments of the process of closing the black box of ADHD, there was no space 
for debating the issue – the disorder was publicly presented as an unproblem-
atic  object  and  quickly  became  a  black  box.  What  would  have  happened, 
however, had people known of alternative theories and treatments, financial 
entanglement of both sides (to mention just CHADD), about the failed attempts 
to confirm neurophysiological studies? Or, how would we begin to approach 
objects  such  as  ADHD  if  we  knew  the  mechanisms  of  producing  scientific 
knowledge identified by ANT?  
Of course, a number of innovations can be implemented in order to make it 
easier to reveal the network character of scientific objects percolating into the 
public action sphere. In practice, it would mean allowing currently marginal-
ised critical voices into the mainstream debates. This is not to say that a parity 
would be created, but that channels should be left open for the articulation of 
criticism, and that the costs thereof should be lowered. Therefore, a system of 
discursive checks and balances is needed, which would either make it impos-
sible to monopolise the space of influence that is the media, or at least make it 
too costly to be profitable
213. It is also necessary to reveal the techniques par-
ticular actors use in promoting their vision. Typically, actors strive to create a 
situation in which their message is broadcast by two or more actors consid-
ered independent of each other, which increases the credibility of a represen-
tation created in such a way. This is why pharmaceutical companies invest 
enormous resources in order for papers published by scientists they finance 
to appear in leading scientific journals and to occupy high positions in press 
discourse. One of the more frequent devices utilised by the companies is using 
the  key  opinion  leaders representing  academic  environment,  who are  pre-
sented  as  independent  experts  in  spite  of  actually  being  supported  by  the 
companies.  This  situation  can  be  treated  as  a  form  of  conflict  of  interest. 
A number of options exist to try to stop such situations. For example, there 
                                                             
213 It is worth referring here to the issue of disease mongering. In theory, this phenomenon results 
from pharmaceutical multinationals’ strategy to maximise their profits, as it is more profitable 
than creating medications for conditions that are already known and already considered danger-
ous. One can, then, imagine an institutional situation in which the costs of “disease marketing” 
would be such that a given company would not be ready to undertake them. AVANT  Volume IV, Number 1/2013 www.avant.edu.pl 
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have long been attempts to make all medical experts involved in evaluating 
medications disclose their sources of funding. Such a regulation is, however, 
inefficient, as the amount of the donation is not disclosed. Therefore, an ex-
pert who was paid $3000 for giving a paper at a conference is perceived in the 
same  way  as  a  researcher  who  regularly  receives  a  yearly  payment  of 
$200,000 from the same company. However, strong opposition exists protest-
ing the introduction of such mechanisms to combat conflicts of interest. It is 
even debated whether the notion of the conflict of interests should be used in 
connection to financing research when it is more characteristic of the political 
arena. 
Thus,  we are approaching another fortification which  in  our society  is  the 
notion of objective truth itself. It is precisely scientific truth that the parties in 
conflicts use for cover when entangling us in philosophically and methodolog-
ically  unsolvable conflicts. Through  such  an account  we cease  to take  into 
consideration social costs of the changes consisting in introducing into circula-
tion new medical categories or science objects in general. In light of the exist-
ing controversies surrounding diagnosis and etiology, is it sensible to restrict 
ourselves to dangerous pharmacological treatment? Would we have been so 
quick to agree to make Ritalin and similar substances the treatment of choice 
while  simultaneously  rejecting  all  alternatives  if  we  were  monitoring  the 
strategies of promoting diseases and medicines used by pharmaceutical com-
panies?  Would  we  agree  to  that,  knowing  that  stimulants  do  not  cure  but 
merely mask the disease or if we knew that they affect everyone in the same 
way? Finally, would we have agreed to the juridisation that constituted a sys-
tem  encouraging  the  ADHD  diagnosis  and  often  enforcing  pharmaceutical 
treatment. 
One of the possible alternatives is the consistent reference to relational ontol-
ogy of ANT. In such a case by making a decision we do not merely depend on 
the representation of the world (its cohesiveness, the reliability of a transla-
tion etc.) but we must also take into consideration other factors. This, howev-
er,  requires  the  reconfiguration  of  conditions  within  which  the  discourse 
functions. Obviously, we risk that the polyphony of voices will paralyse deci-
sion-making and practical action. However, does the alternative in the form of 
uncontrolled and hasty closing of black boxes seem sensible, taking into ac-
count the example of ADHD and the possibility that we are facing a way of 
treatment that is both ineffective and dangerous to health, in order to deal 
with a disease that may not be a disease at all? Are we ready to accept such 
a way of making decisions and the procedure of scientific innovation, consid-
ering the danger that is associated with it? We leave these doubts open for 
now. It seems, however, that ANT points to a direction that should be followed 
to deal with such controversies. 
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